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A CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY FOR INJURED EMPLOYEES
Gerald B. Murphy
INTRODUCTION
The 1973 Constitution of Montana includes Section 16 of the Declara-
tion of Rights which states:
Courts of Justice shall be open to every person, and speedy
remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or character.
No person shall be deprived of this full legal redress for injury
incurred in employment for which another person may be liable
except as to fellow employees and his immediate employer who hired
him if such immediate employer provided coverage under the Work-
men's Compensation Laws of this state. Right and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay.'
This section repudiates established Montana law as well as the 1971.
Montana Legislature's rejection of similar legislation.
The purpose of this note is to discuss the three avenues (Judicial,
Legislative, and Constitutional) used by the advocates of Section 16 to
accomplish their desired result: to allow an employee of an independ-
ent contractor to bring a third party liability suit against his general
employer. In order to put this discussion in proper context, it is
initially necessary to trace the development of Worker Welfare laws.
HISTORY
Prior to the enactment of Industrial Accident Laws, injured work-
men were rarely compensated for their injuries. Industry had gen-
erally escaped this burden by asserting available common-law defenses
such as assumption of risk, contributory negligence and the fellow
servant doctrine.' These defenses were utilized so effectively that few
injured workmen received compensation. 3 Workmen's Compensation Laws
were thus enacted to remedy the situation.4 The theory of the laws was
to provide compensation, or in effect insurance, to an injured employee
regardless of how he was injured.5 An injured employee would recover
'Proposed 1972 Constitution for the State of Montana, Official Text with Explanation.
On November 2, 1971, 100 delegates were elected from twenty-three dis-
tricts to the 1971-72 Constitutional Convention. A three day organizational
session was held beginning November 29, 1972. The main session was con-
vened on January 17, 1972 .... After meeting for fifty-four working days
the Convention adjourned sine die on March 24, 1972.
The new constitution was accepted by the people of Montana on June 6, 1972, and
the constitution took effect on July 1, 1973.
2Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954).
3Id.
4Staton v. Reynolds Metals Co., 58 F. Supp. 657 (D.C.W.D. Ky. 1945).
5Dunn v. N.D. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 191 N.W.2d 181 (N.D. 1971).
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whether he was injured due to his own or his employer's negligence.'
To come under the act, both the employer and employee must make
an election, and by so electing, the employee surrenders his right to
sue the employer for additional damages. 7
There are at least two types of workmen's compensation provisions
limiting the common-law actions against general employers: (a) those
which merely require the general employer or independent contractor
to see that his independent contractor or subcontractor carries com-
pensation insurance," and (b) those which directly impose liability on
him for injuries to the employees of his independent contractor or sub-
contractor.' Montana has the former provision set forth in R.C.M. 1947,
§ 92-438.10 Since Montana had not decided the question of whether
R.C.M. 1947, § 92-438 would permit a third party liability suit against
a general employer, injured employees sought judicial clarification of
Montana's workmen's compensation laws.
JUDICIAL REMEDY
The Montana supreme court in Ashcraft v. Montana Power Co."
interpreted Montana's workmen's compensation laws. In Ashcraft, the
plaintiff was an employee of Swain & Morris, an independent contractor
of the defendant, Montana Power Company. He was injured when
the power pole on which he was working fell to the ground. Montana
Power had required Swain & Morris to come within the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The Montana supreme court ruled that since Mon-
tana Power had required the independent contractor, Swain & Morris,
to come within the *Workmen's Compensation Act, the injured employee
was precluded from maintaining a third party liability suit against
his general employer. The court's decision was based on R.C.M. 1947,
§ 92-438 which reads in part:
'Barber Asphalt Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 193 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266
(1943); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185, 290 P.2d 693 (1955).
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA 1947, § 92-204 [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947].
'2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 175 (1970); Anderson v. Sanderson & Port-
er, 142 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Huffstettler v. Lion Oil Co., 110 F. Supp. 233 (D.C.
S.D. Tex. 1953). Jurisdictions that have this type statute: Louisiana, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, and South Carolina.
'Hoffman v. Cudahy Packing Co., 161 Kan. 345, 167 P.2d 613 (1946); Shuck v.
Hendershot, 185 Kan. 673, 347 P.2d 362 (1959). Those jurisdictions that have this
type statute: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
"OR.C.M. 1947, § 92-438 reads as follows:
Independent Contractor defined. "An independent contractor" is one who
renders service in the course of an occupation, representing the will of his em-
ployer only as the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is
accomplished. But the legal defense of independent contractor shall not bar
otherwise compensable industrial accident claims against employers except when
such defense is interposed on behalf of a party who has previously required the
claimant's immediate employer to come within the Workmen's Compensation Act.
uAshcraft v. Montana Power Co., 156 Mont. 368, 480 P.2d 815 (1971).
[Vol. 35
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... but the legal defense of independent contractor shall not bar
otherwise compensable industrial accident claims against employers
except when such defense is interposed on behalf of the party who
has previously required the claimant's immediate employer to come
within the Workmen's Compensation Act. 2
The court also stated: "Since the contract in the instant case designated
Swain & Morris an independent contractor who was required by the
defendant to carry workmen's compensation insurance, the defendant is
completely immune from liability under R.C.M. 1947, § 92-438." 13
The Montana supreme court denied plaintiff the judicial remedy
he sought. In this three to one decision the court stated that the ex-
clusive remedy against a general employer by an injured employee of
an independent contractor required to carry workmen's compensation
insurance is that provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. 14 The
general employer acquires complete immunity from third party liability
suits by conforming to R.C.M. 1947, § 92-438.15
Buerkel v. Montana Power Company/16 was decided subsequent to the
Ashcraft decision and is considered a sequel to Ashcraft.'7 In Buerkle,
the plaintiff, a lineman employed by Duty & Jones Construction Company,
an independent contractor of the defendant, was injured during the
course of his employment. As he was working on a pole, another em-
ployee caused a boom on a mechanical digger to hit the pole. The
pole snapped and fell injuring the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant, as a landowner, had a duty to use reasonable care in
maintaining its premises in a safe condition. The plaintiff also alleged
that the defense of "statutory employer" was not available to a general
contractor where his subcontractor is enrolled under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, and it is the contractor's negligence that causes
injury to the subcontractor's employee.' 8
Relying on the Ashcraft decision, the court ruled that R.C.M. 1947,
§ 92-438,19 when read in conjunction with R.C.M. 1947, § 92-60420 and
21d. at 370.
"Id. at 371. It should be noted that the court also stated:
This rule of law does not apply to any other situation where the status of the
injured employee's immediate employer is found to be other than an 'independent
contractor,' or where the general contractor does not require an independent
contractor to carry workmen's compensation insurance. Likewise, this rule of
law does not apply to the independent tortfeasors who are 'strangers to the
employment' under section 92-204, R.C.M. 1947.
14'Id.
11d.
"Buerkle v. Montana Power Co., 157 Mont. 57, 482 P.2d 564 (1971).
"Id.
1id.
"-R.C.M. 1947, § 92-438, supra at note 10.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 92-604 reads as follows:
Employer liable when lets work to other than independent contractor. Where
any employer procures any work to be done, wholly or in part for him, by a con-
tractor other than an independent contractor, and the work so procured to be
done is a part or process in the trade or business of such employer, then such
1974]
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§ 92-204,21 precluded plaintiff's recovery. The court noted:
* * * section 92-438 prevents a general contractor from using the
defense of 'independent contractor' where he does not require an
employee's immediate employer to carry workmen's compensation
insurance. Therefore, if the general contractor cannot use the 'inde-
pendent contractor' defense, then, he falls within the scope of section
92-604, which as previously described makes him exclusively liable
for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act in accord-
ance with section 92-204. Therefore, if section 92-438 in conjunction
with sections 92-604 and 92-204 limit the liability of a general con-
tractor exclusively to compensation under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act in circumstances just described, is it reasonable under
the same statutes to assume that where a general contractor re-
quires the employee's immediate contractor to carry workmen's
compensation insurance, the general contractor is not immue from
a common-law liability suit as a third party? This court does not
believe so.'
Strengthening the Montana supreme court's interpretation of
the Workmen's Compensation Act was a recently decided federal case,
Campbell v. Shell Oil Company.2 3 Although Campbell is a federal de-
cision it adds to the state court's interpretation because the federal judge
was obligated to follow state law as he interpreted it.
24
In Campbell, the plaintiff, foreman for Daniel Oilfield Construction,
Inc. was employed by the defendant, Shell Oil Co., to do general main-
tenance and corrective work on Shell Oil Company's property. As part
of Mr. Campbell's work, he put alcohol into a pipe in order to thaw it
out. He was inspecting this work when Peek, foreman for Shell working
in the scope of his employment, negligently opened the valve in the
pipe causing the fluid in the line to hit the plaintiff in the face and
knock him down. As a result of this event, Mr. Campbell was injured.2 5
The United States District Court, Billings Division, applying the
rules of Ashcraft2 6 and Buerkle27 to the Campbell facts stated that it
made no difference whether Shell Oil Company was or was not an
independent contractor. The court stated:
employer shall be liable to pay all compensation under this act to the same ex-
tent as if the work were done without the intervention of such contractor. And
the work so procured to be done shall not be construed to be "casual employ-
ment. ''
-R.C.M. 1947, § 92-204 in part provides:
Provided that whenever such employee shall receive an injury while performing
the duties of his employment and such injury or injuries, so received by such
employee, are caused by the act or omission of some persons or corporations other
than his employer, or the servants or employees of his employer, then such em-
ployee, or in case of his death his heirs or personal representatives, shall, in
addition to the right to receive compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, have a right to prosecute any course of action he may have for damages
against such persons or corporations, causing such injury.
2Buerkle v. Montana Power Co., supra note 16 at 60-61.
Campbell v. Shell Oil Co., 329 F. Supp. 846 (U.S.D.C. Mont. 1971).
"Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
uCampbell v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 23 at 846, 847.
"Ashcraft v. Montana Power Co., supra note 11.
2 Buerkle v. Montana Power Co., supra note 16.
[Vol. 35
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Under the rule of Ashcraft, if Daniel is an independent con-
tractor, the plaintiff is barred by Section 92-438 from collecting
in a negligence action from the general employer, Shell Oil Com-
pany. If, on the other hand, Daniel is not an independent con-
tractor, then, under the rule of Buerkle, the defendant is immune
from a common law liability suit as a third party under Section
92-604 and Section 92-204.'
The court stated further that the effect of the Buerkle rule was to sub-
stitute the general employer for the plaintiff's immediate employer,
where the independent contractor defense is not available to the general
employer. 29 "The general employer's liability under this rule, however,
is restricted to workmen's compensation insurance. 30 The court held
that since Shell Oil required Daniel to carry workmen's compensation
insurance, at the minimum, the common law liability suit of Mr. Camp-
bell must fail.
3
'
With these three cases in mind, it is evident that an injured em-
ployee cannot bring a common-law third party liability suit against
his general employer where the employer complied with R.C.M. 1947,
§ 92-438.32 At most, the general employer will be liable to the extent
of Workmen's Compensation where the "independent contractor" de-
fense is not available.
33
Just nine days after receiving an adverse decision at the hands
of the Judiciary, advocates of Section 16 proceeded to the Legislature.
LEGISLATIVE REMEDY
In 1965 the legislature amended R.C.MI. 1947, § 92-438. 3 4 The amend-
ment,3 5 simply stated that if the principal employer complies with
R.C.M. 1947, § 92-438 as amended, he pays no compensation claims to
employees of independent contractors. The legislature in this amend-
ment attempted to clarify the remedy of workmen's compensation as
to employer-employee relationships. This amendment was by no means
a unanimous measure and thus, opponents of the Ashcraft decision38
introduced a bill in the 1971 Legislature, Senate Bill No. 331, to reverse
the effect.37 The bill introduced was entitled:
AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION 92-204, R.C.M. 1947, TO
DEFINE THIRD PARTIES AGAINST WHOM INJURED WORK-
MEN MAY PROSECUTE CAUSES OF ACTION TO INCLUDE
PRIME CONTRACTORS AND GENERAL CONTRACTORS AND
2Campbell v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 23 at 848.
2Id.
8'Id.
mId. at 849.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 92-438.
'
3Campbell v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 23 at 849.
MR.C.M. 1947, § 92-438.
5Ashcraft v. Montana Power Co., supra note 11.
"Id.
3
'Senate Bill No. 331, Introduced by Dzivi and Lynch, January 21, 1971.
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OWNERS WHO HAVE NOT BECOME LIABLE FOR WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 92-438,
R.C.M. 1947."
The pertinent insertion was as follows:
Provided, that whenever such employee shall receive an injury
while performing the duties of his employment and such injury or
injuries, so received by such employee, are caused by the act or
omission of some persons or corporation other than his employer,
or the servants or employees of his employer, but including owners,
prime contractors and general contractors who have not become
liable to such employee for workmen's compensation benefits under
the provisions of section 92-438, R.C.M. 1947, by reasons of the
failure of such employee's immediate employer to come within the
Workmen's Compensation Act, then such representatives, shall, in
addition to the right to receive compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, have a right to prosecute any cause of action he
may have for damages against such persons or corporations, causing
such injury.'
The amendment's obvious intent was to place the owner, prime
contractor and general contractor in the category of third parties
and thus subject them to third party liability suits. Senate Bill 331 was
passed in the Senate by a roll call vote of twenty-nine to twenty-three.4 0
The House of Representatives returned the bill to the Senate after adopt-
ing an adverse committee report which killed the legislation.
Once again thwarted, proponents of the common-law rights of injured
workmen found themselves confronted with a unique opportunity. Mon-
tana's Constitutional Convention was preparing a new constitution to
be voted on by the people of Montana. 4 1 Recognizing this to be a final
opportunity, they sought to obtain their goal by placing Section 16
into the Declaration of Rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY
The official explanation mailed to the voters concerning Section 16
stated: "This section adds to the 1889 constitution by specifically
granting to a person injured in employment the right to sue a third
party causing the injury, except his employer or fellow employee when
his employer provides coverage under workmen's compensation laws. ' 4 2
The Bill of Rights Committee, headed by the same counsel who
argued in Ashcraft,43 drafted Section 16 and made the following com-
ments:
38id.
"MONTANA SENATE JOURNAL 451 (1971).
"Official Text (1972), supra note 1.
"2d.
"Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, Vol. VIII, Montana Constitutional Convention,
1971-1972. Reported February 23, 1972. Committee members: Wade J. Dahood, Ch.,
Chet Blaylock, V.Ch., Bob Campbell, Dorothy Eck, Donald R. Foster, R. S. (Bob)
Hanson, George H. James, Rachell K. Mansfield, Lyle R. Monroe, Marshall Murray,
and Veronica Sullivan.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Dahood argued and lost Ashcraft v. Montana
Power Co., supra note 11, which is overruled by Section 16 of the Declaration of
Rights, hereinunder discussed.
[Vol. 35
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o . . Under Montana law, as announced in the recent decision
of Asheraft v. Montana Powfrn.o.,,the-.employee has no redress
against third parties for' ihjhi&Recadsed b them if his immediate
employer is covered under the Workmen's Compensation law. The
Committee feels that this violates the spirit of the guarantee of a
speedy remedy for all injuries of person, property or character.
* . . The Committee urges that this is an abuse of the Workmen's
Compensation Law and constitutes a misapplication of that law to
protect persons who are negligent."
The addition of Section 16 has a tremendous impact upon the
current status of workmen's compensation law. The section, in effect,
reverses the results of judicial interpretation and legislative action.
EFFECT
The guarded immunity from third party liability cherished by the
general employer no longer exists. The effect of Section 16 is to pro-
vide an injured workman with an avenue of redress against a general
employer, even if his employer be required to carry workmen's compen-
sation insurance. The injured employee will be able to maintain
a common law third party liability suit against his general employer.
This additional right to sue will expose the general employer to litigation
which he previously could have avoided. General employers' costs for
legal assistance will increase. In addition, if the workman prevails, the
general employer must bear the burden of an adverse judgment.
In theory, Section 16 stands for the proposition that all injured
persons are guaranteed a full and speedy remedy for their injuries.
This is a noble and just purpose, however, it remains to be seen how
effectively this new avenue of redress can be utilized by injured em-
ployees.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional conventions meet infrequently and thus a constitu-
tional remedy of this nature is rare. The tenacious advocates of Section
16 were presented with a unique opportunity and took advantage of it.
The Constitutional Convention presented them with an opportunity to
seek reform after having been first defeated by the judiciary and
secondly by the legislature. As a consequence, Section 16 was drafted
into the new Constitution. Montana's new constitution permits an in-
jured employee to bring a common law third party suit against his
general employer.
"Id. at 30-31.
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